Power, Law, Division of Labor, Cooperation
Four Dimensions of Human Society

This paper proposes the “Institutional Signal-to-Noise Ratio” (Institutional SNR) as a core theoretical tool for analyzing the functioning of human societies, and provides its operationalized definition along with trial calculations for six countries. Power, law, division of labor, and cooperation constitute the four fundamental dimensions of society. Law possesses a dual nature—top-down power-type law increases institutional noise, while bottom-up trust-type law that evolves organically increases institutional signal—and these two are not binary categories but a continuous spectrum. When power-type law systematically crowds out trust-type law (through four micro-level pathways: legislators’ incentives for jurisdictional expansion, crisis window effects, compliance industry lobbying, and declining marginal costs of digital regulation), SNR falls below a critical threshold and society enters a low-trust, high-compliance trap. The refinement of the division of labor transforms thick-relationship cooperation (interpersonal collaboration based on reciprocity) into thin-institutional coordination (interface compatibility based on algorithms and compliance) in a highly path-dependent manner, yet this transformation can be consciously and partially reversed within localized institutional spaces. This paper conducts mechanism-tracing through three in-depth case studies—the Nordic countries, the French Ancien Régime, and the platform economy—and proposes three institutional design pathways: regulatory sunset clauses, protocol governance, and the reconstruction of cooperative radius, together with an analysis of their implementation constraints.

I Introduction: From the Naïve Model to Institutional SNR

1.1 The Naïve Model and Its Shortcomings

An intuitive initial hypothesis holds that power and law are two sides of the same coin, jointly driving ever-finer divisions of labor; that the division of labor erodes the social foundations of cooperation; that the resulting decline in cooperation lowers trust; and that declining trust demands ever more legal intervention—thus forming a positive feedback loop. This “naïve model” is heuristically useful but flawed: it treats law unidimensionally as an instrument of power, posits a zero-sum relationship between division of labor and cooperation, and cannot account for “high-complexity, high-prosperity” cases such as Byzantium, the Song Dynasty, or the Nordic countries.

1.2 Core Theory: Institutional Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)

SNR_proxy is a measurable approximation (proxy indicator) of the conceptual definition of SNR; the two are not equivalent definitions. The conceptual definition captures the net contribution of institutions to social cooperation; the proxy indicator uses available cross-national data to approximate this concept. This framework acknowledges the dual nature of law (law simultaneously carries signal and noise components rather than being one or the other), the complexity of the division-of-labor–cooperation relationship (micro-level downgrading and macro-level emergence coexist), and can provide a unified explanation for both positive and negative cases.

1.3 Scope and Limitations

This paper focuses on the triadic relationship among institutional complexity, trust, and cooperation, employing historical cases as heuristic illustrations rather than definitive evidence. It does not attempt to establish universal historical laws but rather proposes a testable analytical framework. Exogenous shocks (wars, pandemics, abrupt climate changes) fall outside the scope of the endogenous dynamics model, though Chapter VII discusses the interaction between SNR and resilience to exogenous shocks.

1.4 Operationalized Indicators

1.5 SNR Trial Calculations: A Preliminary Six-Country Comparison

The following is a directional trial calculation based on the World Bank WGI (2024) Government Effectiveness scores, World Values Survey social trust percentages, OECD compliance cost indicators, and the SolAbility Governance Capital Index (2024). The values are standardized rankings, not precise SNR values, and are intended solely to verify the directional consistency of the SNR hypothesis.

Note: WGI Government Effectiveness is a percentile ranking (0–100); WVS trust represents the proportion of respondents answering “most people can be trusted”; compliance burden is a qualitative rating (based on OECD iREG and business environment data); governance index ranking is based on the SolAbility 2024 Governance Capital Index (192 countries). This table provides directional validation, not causal proof.

The six-country data are directionally consistent with the SNR hypothesis: countries with high government effectiveness × high social trust ÷ low compliance burden (Nordic countries) do indeed rank at the top of governance indices; countries with high compliance burden × low social trust (Brazil, the United States) rank significantly lower. Singapore is particularly noteworthy—its social trust is moderate but its government effectiveness is extremely high and its compliance burden very low, allowing its SNR to remain elevated. This supports the V3 conclusion: the key to SNR is not the absolute level of trust, but the signal-to-noise ratio.

II Power and Law: Symbiosis, Duality, and the Crowding-Out Mechanism

2.1 Power Operates Through Law

Foucault identified law as the primary instrument of sovereignty, and the field in which power operates is precisely the demarcation between the legal and the illegal.[1] Habermas confirmed that law presupposes the existence of political power, while political power itself is constituted through legal forms.[2] Disciplinary power permeates other forms of power, enabling its effects to reach the most capillary extremities.[1]

2.2 The Self-Proliferation Mechanism of Law

Teubner’s theory of legal autopoiesis reveals the fragmented self-proliferation of the legal system: the same individual is an “employee” in labor law, a “consumer” in consumer protection law, and a “taxpayer” in tax law—such fragmentation demands yet more law to define ambiguous boundaries of responsibility.[3] The compliance burden of the U.S. federal tax code is extraordinarily heavy: taxpayers collectively spend approximately 6.5 billion hours and roughly $280 billion in opportunity costs each year.[4][5]

2.3 The Spectral Nature of Law: From Pure Signal to Pure Noise

Law does not function solely as a conduit of power. Medieval merchant law (Lex Mercatoria) arose spontaneously among merchants, constructing trust across bloodlines and national boundaries among strangers—its judges possessed no police power and could not compel enforcement, yet it sufficed to make trade flourish.[37][38] Hayek warned in 1973 that “legislation” (thesis) was devouring “law” (nomos).[39]

In reality, however, law is not an either/or proposition—any given statute typically carries both signal and noise components simultaneously. Antitrust law is both state power intervening in markets (noise) and a set of rules that protects competitive order to maintain fair exchange (signal). V4 therefore replaces the V3 binary with a continuous spectrum:

Ostrom’s eight institutional design principles—clearly defined boundaries, proportional costs and benefits, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to organize, and nested governance[44]—can be viewed as operationalized criteria for high-signal/low-noise legal design. Rules that satisfy Ostrom’s principles tend to increase institutional signal; those that violate them tend to increase noise.

2.4 Four Micro-Level Pathways Through Which Trust-Type Law Is Crowded Out

If the signal component of law is valuable, why is it systematically crowded out? This paper identifies four micro-level mechanisms:

III Trust: The Front End of the Power Mechanism and Nonlinear Effects

3.1 Power Asymmetry Tends to Erode Trust

Systematic research indicates that interpersonal trust in unequal power relationships tends to be lower than in egalitarian ones.[6] Keltner et al.’s 2003 power approach-inhibition theory provides a neuropsychological explanation: possessing power tends to shift an individual’s attentional focus from others toward the self.[7] However, an important boundary condition exists: transparent, accountable, service-oriented public authority can coexist with high institutional trust. Opaque, unidirectional, and unaccountable power relationships tend to erode interpersonal trust, whereas transparent procedural authority can serve as a scaffold for trust—as illustrated by Singapore in the §1.5 trial calculations.

3.2 Nonlinear Characteristics of the Crowding-Out Effect

Experiments by Bohnet, Frey, and Huck reveal that weak enforcement “crowds in” trustworthiness, moderate enforcement “crowds out” trustworthiness, and strong enforcement restores compliance through deterrence—the relationship between legal coercion and trust is not a simple monotonic negative correlation.[9] Within the SNR framework: in weakly enforced environments, trust-type law (reputation and reciprocity mechanisms) dominates → high signal; in moderately enforced environments, power-type law partially displaces trust-type law → signal declines, noise rises → SNR falls; in strongly enforced environments, deterrence effects restore order but intrinsic trust has been supplanted → stability maintained at high cost.

3.3 The Empirical Landscape of the Global Trust Crisis

Habermas’s colonization thesis holds that the economic and state subsystems increasingly penetrate the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld.[11] The 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer (28 countries, 33,000+ respondents) shows that approximately sixty percent of global respondents exhibit moderate to high levels of economic grievance, and roughly seventy percent believe that key institutional actors deliberately mislead the public.[24] Longitudinal data from the World Values Survey reveal a notable bifurcation: in most OECD countries, institutional trust and interpersonal trust follow different trajectories of decline—institutional trust is falling faster than interpersonal trust, suggesting that the source of the problem lies more at the institutional level (declining SNR) than at the level of human nature.[31]

IV Division of Labor and Cooperation: Downgrading, Paradox, and Emergence

4.1 From Thick-Relationship Cooperation to Thin-Institutional Coordination

Each historical leap in the division of labor transforms cooperation from thicker social-relational forms into thinner institutional-coordination forms. The three modes of economic integration identified by Polanyi—reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange—constitute the institutional foundations of this transformation.[14]

This transformation is highly path-dependent at the macro-institutional level: once new institutional frameworks encode new modes of coordination, the older thick-relationship cooperation loses its institutional support. Yet this path dependence is not absolutely irreversible—history provides cases of localized reversal: the Israeli kibbutz movement, community-supported agriculture (CSA), Germany’s co-determination system (Mitbestimmung), and the community self-governance of common-pool resources studied by Ostrom[44] all demonstrate that thick-relationship cooperation can be consciously rebuilt under certain conditions—though the scale and durability of these reversals are limited, and they typically occur within the interstices of macro-level thin-institutional frameworks.

Durkheim anticipated that “organic solidarity” would replace “mechanical solidarity”[30]—he correctly identified the increase in functional interdependence but underestimated the social costs of losing thick-relationship cooperation. Tomasello’s cross-cultural developmental psychology research demonstrates that cooperation is a neurochemical default in human beings—shared intentionality and joint action emerge spontaneously in infancy, prior to any institutional arrangement.[45] This implies that thick-relationship cooperation is not something that needs to be “manufactured” but rather something that needs to “not be institutionally suppressed.”

4.2 The Cooperation Paradox: Micro-Level Downgrading and Macro-Level Emergence

Macro-level coordination emerges not from interpersonal trust but from infrastructure (price mechanisms, standard protocols, platform algorithms). Yet this infrastructure is built by corporations and states, subject to the same power logic, and therefore structurally fragile: the fracturing of global supply chains amid geopolitical conflict (2020–2022), the unilateral dominance of platform algorithms over workers, and what Farrell and Newman describe as “weaponized interdependence”—states leveraging hub positions in global networks as instruments of coercion.[41] Macro-level emergence is the result and manifestation of micro-level downgrading, not compensation for it.

V The Inflation of Institutional Maintenance Costs

A 2025 OECD report indicates that over the past seventy years, the growth in the volume of U.S. federal regulations correlates with a decline in economic growth rates, though the causal direction and precise magnitude remain under investigation.[16] U.S. construction sector labor productivity declined by more than 30% between 1970 and 2020, with increasingly stringent land-use regulations identified as a plausible contributing mechanism, though not the sole cause.[17]

Graeber estimated that as many as 40% of workers in developed countries consider their jobs to lack substantive meaning,[18] while a 2025 paper published in Economic Affairs attributes such jobs to four mechanisms of regulatory inflation: regulatory expansion converts productive effort into compliance, price signals are distorted, symbolic labor proliferates, and talent is drawn into administrative and speculative domains.[19] Within the SNR framework, the common essence of these phenomena is the inflation of the institutional noise component—an ever-growing share of social resources is devoted to maintaining the institutional system itself, rather than producing substantive cooperative outcomes.

VI Three In-Depth Case Studies: Mechanism-Tracing of SNR

6.1 High-SNR Case: The Nordic Model

Denmark and Sweden have among the world’s highest tax rates (40–50% of GDP) and dense labor regulations, yet simultaneously possess the highest social trust globally (WVS 66–74%), the highest government effectiveness (WGI 95th–96th percentile), and top innovation indices. The §1.5 trial calculations confirm their high-SNR status. Mechanism-tracing reveals three key factors: First, while tax rates are high, the tax structure is extremely simple and transparent—Swedish personal income tax returns can be completed on a mobile phone in five minutes because the government pre-fills nearly all information. Second, the bureaucratic system is highly digitized, with short interaction pathways between citizens and government. Third, and most critically—the signal component of the legal system far exceeds the noise component: labor protections, social security, and property registration all substantially satisfy Ostrom’s principles (clearly defined boundaries, proportional costs, collective-choice participation), while licensing requirements and administrative procedures are continually streamlined. The Nordic countries demonstrate the viability of “high legal volume + high signal concentration = high SNR.”

6.2 Low-SNR Case: The French Ancien Régime (1700–1789)

A 2025 Harvard/NBER working paper uses quantitative data to verify the causal relationship between tax burdens and revolutionary mobilization:[46] the pre-revolutionary tax system essentially exempted clergy and nobility, with the Third Estate bearing virtually the entire burden (25–30% of income). The salt tax (gabelle) alone accounted for 22% of royal revenue, and rates varied enormously across regions, creating countless “tax frontiers.” The tax-farming system (fermiers-généraux) outsourced tax collection to private contractors—an extreme form of power-type law where law served not the public interest but the profit extraction of contractors and the crown. Representatives from high-tax constituencies were approximately 60% more likely to deliver tax-related speeches in the National Assembly. The Ancien Régime was a textbook low-SNR system: institutional self-maintenance costs (the privileged estates’ tax exemptions, the tax farmers’ profit extraction, the collection expenses of multiple layers of indirect taxation) far exceeded its cooperative output (public services were virtually nonexistent).

6.3 Rapid SNR Decline Case: The Platform Economy (2010s–Present)

The platform economy presents a contemporary case of rapid SNR decline within a short timeframe. Early platforms (eBay’s rating system, Airbnb’s mutual reviews) functioned essentially as digitized trust-type law—user-generated reputation mechanisms that replaced state regulation. But as platforms scaled, two trends occurred simultaneously: First, platforms themselves began exercising the functions of power-type law—algorithms unilaterally determined rankings, pricing, and account suspensions, workers had no avenue for appeal, and “user agreements” became non-negotiable unilateral decrees.[15] Second, states began imposing dense external regulation on platforms (GDPR, the Digital Markets Act, ride-hailing regulations in various countries), adding substantial compliance noise. The result of this dual-noise overlay: the platform economy’s initially high SNR (user mutual reviews + low regulation) rapidly deteriorated to low SNR (algorithmic autocracy + compliance inflation), while the original trust-type law (reputation mechanisms) was crowded out by power-type law from both sides.

VII Internalizing Counterexamples, Exogenous Shocks, and the Explanatory Power of SNR

The Byzantine Empire (large bureaucracy + 1,123 years of survival): the bureaucracy was large but the execution pathways were efficient—SNR could be maintained. The Song Dynasty (extensive commercial regulation + economic prosperity): much of the legal complexity consisted of high-signal-component codification of commercial customs. Somalia (anarchy + poverty): no system ≠ simple system; SNR is undefined.

The explanatory power of the SNR hypothesis lies in the fact that it does not require “less law is better,” only that the signal component continuously exceeds the noise component. However, a purely endogenous dynamics model encounters a boundary: exogenous shocks (the Black Death, abrupt climate change, external military invasion) can reset the system at any SNR level. Nevertheless, an interactive relationship exists between SNR and resilience to exogenous shocks: high-SNR systems tend to possess greater shock-buffering capacity (because the effective output of institutions includes crisis-response capability), while low-SNR systems deteriorate slowly even in the absence of exogenous shocks—as the middle-to-late Ottoman Empire illustrates. Exogenous shocks are not an alternative explanation to the SNR model but an amplifier that interacts with SNR: high SNR + strong shock = recoverable; low SNR + strong shock = collapse.

VIII Meta-Analysis of Research Paradigms: The Co-Evolution of Cognition and Structure

The 2026 finding in Nature Communications Psychology[22] receives an explanatory hypothesis within this paper’s framework: face-to-face interactions in laboratories reproduce thick-relationship conditions and preserve the biological default of cooperation; but the macro social structure has already entered the thin-institutional coordination phase, and declining institutional SNR leads people to perceive the degradation of cooperation in their daily experience. This explanation requires further empirical testing—in particular, a cross-national comparison of “the gap between perceived cooperation and actual cooperative behavior” across countries at different SNR levels.

IX Structural Blind Spots in Mainstream Narratives

Mainstream policy discourse tends to treat trust as a “thermometer” of institutional health—improve the economy and trust naturally rebounds; root out corruption and trust naturally recovers. The SNR framework advanced in this paper repositions trust as the “foundation” of institutions—when SNR falls below a critical threshold, no adjustments to the superstructure can restore functionality.

The “social trap” revealed by Rothstein and Uslaner supports this assessment: low-trust societies struggle to generate policies that repair inequality, while inequality further depresses trust.[23] Longitudinal data from the World Values Survey (1981–2022) show that in most OECD countries, institutional trust is declining faster than interpersonal trust—suggesting the source of the problem lies at the institutional level. More crucially, the countries with the highest social trust (the Nordic states) are precisely the countries with the highest institutional SNR—not the countries with the fewest laws or the smallest governments. This refutes two popular but opposing narratives—”smaller government is always better” (libertarianism) and “more regulation means more safety” (regulationism)—and supports a more precise proposition: what determines the level of social trust is not the absolute size of institutions but their signal-to-noise ratio.

The persistence of this blind spot has institutional causes: acknowledging that trust is a foundation rather than a thermometer amounts to admitting that all existing institutions—regardless of their position on the political spectrum—may be systematically eroding their own legitimacy base. No incumbent power holder has an incentive to make this diagnosis. At the same time, “trust” cannot be repaired with a single policy tool, nor can it produce results within a single electoral cycle—which ensures it is perpetually deferred in short-term-oriented policy agendas behind “more urgent” economic and security issues.

X Conclusion: Traps, Pathways, and Implementation Constraints

10.1 The Structure of the Low-Trust, High-Compliance Trap

When institutional SNR declines persistently, the system enters a low-trust, high-compliance trap. The interest groups that benefit from high noise (the compliance industry, bureaucracies, and corporate legal departments of large firms) are precisely the most influential actors in the system—they extract rents from institutional noise and therefore have strong incentives to maintain or even expand it. Historically, the “exit” from this trap has typically been reconstruction following systemic collapse. In the nuclear age, the costs of the traditional “violent reset” pathway are unacceptable.

10.2 AI: Amplifier, Not Antidote

AI can simplify legal systems (automated compliance, intelligent legislative review), but it may equally become a super-accelerator of institutional noise: when AI generates compliance requirements at near-zero marginal cost, this is the extreme manifestation of Pathway Four described in §2.4. What matters is not AI itself but the direction in which it is deployed—whether it is used to improve SNR (reducing noise, strengthening signal) or to accelerate SNR decline (automatically generating more noise). This is a political choice, not a technical question.

10.3 Three Institutional Design Pathways

10.4 Implementation Constraints and Window Conditions

The common challenge across all three pathways is: who has the incentive to drive SNR improvement? Actors who benefit from noise will not voluntarily accept “garbage collection.” This paper identifies three possible window conditions:

First, the crisis window. Paradoxically, crises are both accelerators of SNR decline (§2.4, Pathway Two) and potential triggers for institutional reset—but only if the direction of crisis-induced reform is toward reducing noise (as in the streamlined design of post-WWII Nordic welfare states) rather than increasing it (as in the compliance inflation following the 2008 financial crisis). The direction depends on the political balance of forces at the time of reform.

Second, local experimentation. National-level institutional overhaul is extraordinarily difficult, but local pilots can bypass central interest groups. China’s 1978 reforms began with Special Economic Zones; Estonia’s digital government started in a small country. SNR improvement can begin with municipal- or provincial-level sunset clause experiments.

Third, digital transparency. While digitalization may accelerate regulatory expansion (§2.4, Pathway Four), it can also compress the information asymmetries exploited by the compliance industry—making the actual SNR contribution of regulations measurable, trackable, and publicly comparable, thereby reducing the rent-seeking space of noise-benefiting interest groups. The high degree of digitalization in Nordic countries is one of the infrastructure conditions underlying their high SNR.

10.5 Final Assessment

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